Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles

School of Law Faculty Scholarship

1980

Tempia, Turner, McOmber and the Military Rules of Evidence: A
Right to Counsel Trio with the New Look
David A. Schlueter
St. Mary's University School of Law, dschlueter@stmarytx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David A. Schlueter, Tempia, Turner, McOmber and the Military Rules of Evidence: A Right to Counsel Trio
with the New Look, Army Law. 1 (April 1980).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.

the army
LAWYER
Department of the Army Pamphlet
27-50-88.
April1980

Tempia, Turner, McOmber and the
Military Rules of Evidence: A }light to
Counsel Trio with the New Look
CPT(P) David A. Schlueter
· Instructor, Criminal Law Division
TJAGSA

Table of COntents
Tempia, Turner, McOmber and the Military Rules
of Evid~nce: A Right to COunsel Tri() with the
New Look
The Impact of Article 82 of Protoool to the
Geneva Conventi~ns on. the. ()rgiudzaticm and
Operation of a Division SJA Office::':~_:_::_:_.:_ __ c
DOD Directive 7200.1 and the Army's Proposed
Dollar Target System: Are Allowances Allowable? .. -cc-~-~-----,--:-cc-c::-;-::-:-r-:---c-.c-:::- ,.,.--:--;:-:-----Judiciary Notes --c-.,:..-..,""c'-""-------------------A Matt~r Of Record --~--------:_ ___ _:__________
Administrative a~d civil Law Sect\on --------Legal Assistance .Items -~----:.cc:::-cc---.,.,--:----,--:-~
Reserve Alfairs Items --.,--,--------_::_ __:__ _:_:_:___
JAGC Pel"sopnel ~~ction -.::--c-:::-----,--,--.-:::-c-,-.;-:-CLE News ------------------------------~--Current Materials
.
.
- of
---- ---Interest
--- -- --- '- ---------------,-_-

-

- -

-

-.].

_-

-~

1
14

·

A

19
~
31
33
37
38
59

65
69

Several significant developments in the law
of military interrogations warrant an examination of a military suspect's rights to counsel.
Fh·st, a seiies of Court of Military Appeals
decisions within the last year or so have either
clarified or expanded military case law on military interrogations. Secondly, and most important, the pending new Military Rules of
Evidence' will ··implement a large amount of
military case law, in some instances alter exist..,
ing law and on the whole moreclosely align the
military interrogation practices with prevailing civilian· rules. Analysis of these developments will center on the three key facets of the
service member's right to counsel at military
interrogations:
-Fifth Amendment Rights: The MirandaTempia Right to Counsel Warnings;
-Sixth Amendment Rights: Right to Consult with Counsel During Interrogations;
and
-Article 27, U.C.M.J. Rights: Notice to
Suspect's Counsel of Pending Interrogation.
At least one of the foregoing rights will raise
its head at any given interrogation. And al-
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though occasionally, two or more will be raised
in any given interrogation case, each will be
here treated separately. Likewise, counsel who
are faced with litigating the admissibility of
an accused's statement should initially approach the right to counsel issues separately,
beginning with an analysis of the applicable
right to counsel warnings. It is that facet to
which we first turn.

cation of the Miranda warnings stands and is
applicable to military interrogations through
the Court of Military Appeals' decision in
United States v. Tempia. 5 The present-day applicability of the Mirand(};-Tempia decisions to
military interrogations centers on a number of
recurring issues:
-Delineating who must give the warnings;
-The definition of "custodial interrogation"

I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WARNINGS

-The scope of the right to "counsel";
-Waiver of the right to counsel; and

The fifth amendment right to remain silent
serves as the keystone for the rights warnings
requirements mandated by the Supreme Court
in Miranda v. Arizona. 2 Citing numerous
works,· statistics, and plain common sense, the
Court recognized the vital need for insuring the
option for a suspect to either remain silent or
to make a voluntary statement. In particular,
the police station interrogation was all too
often equated with coercion, deception, and
intimidation. Resisting arguments that police
functions would be fatally undermined, the
Court mandated the now familiar Mirarnda
warnings. a. Despite efforts to modify Miranda
through judicial and legislative4 channels, the
case stands. More important is that the appliThe Judge Advocate General
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-The Miranda exclusionary rule.
The following discussion will in turn center on
each of these issues with attention being given
to recent case law and the pending rules changes
in the Manual for Courts-Martial. We first address the question of who must give the right
to counsel, the Miranda-Tempia, warnings.
A; Who Is Required to Give the MirandaTempia Warnings?
The Miranda decision requires that the counsel warnings be given by law enforcement
officers. 6 The 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial
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provisiOn noted t}lat the Article ,31 (b) warnings7 and the right to counsel warnings were
to be given by persons "subject to the code or
acting as an instrument of such a person or a
unit of the armed force." 8
The new Military Rules of Evidence· provision on this point also links the Miranda warnings with Article 31 (b) warnings. and states
that the right to counsel warnings must be
given by persons subject to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. 9 By definition. those persons
knowingly acting as an "agent of a military
unit or of a person subject to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice" must also give the Miranda
warnings. 10
The linkage between Article. 31 (b) warnings
and the Miranda warnings is not new to military case law which in the past has often rested
upon the Article 31 (b) "persons subject to the
Code" language in determining who must give
the Miranda warnings.U However, it is clear
that not everyone subject to the Code need give
Miranda warnings-'-only those acting in either
an official capacity12 or those in a position of
authority13 over the suspect and then only when
the suspect is in "custody."
Civilian investigators questioning a service
member are of course bound by the Miranda
requirements but foreign investigators are not
necessarily so bound. A recent example of this
was presented in United States v. Jones 14 where
German law enforcewent agents interrogated
the accl.J,s.ed "for theben~fit of the Germ~mGov
ernmEmi:•1s His siatements to the foreign police
were admitted into evidence at his courtmartial over the defense objection that no
proper Miranda warnings had been given. The
Court of Military Appeals held that the German
interrogators were not required to give any
Miranda warnings because under the facts presented they had not acted as "instrumentalities" of military authoritieS. 16 Had military
investigators played an active role in t.he iJ;J,terrogation or had the German~ condu9t.ed ~··~he
interrogation at the request of military authorities, the accused's argument would have no
doubt prevailed. 17

Another permutation of the question of who
must give the warnings relates to the oft-used
police tactic of using informants or police in an
undere"over capacity to elicit incriminating evidence from suspects. Absent possible sixth
amendment problems, civilian courts generally
have little problem in relieving the questioners
from giving the Miranda warnings; if not for
policy reasons, at least for the reason that most
of the undercover activity is not "custodial." 18
To date, the military courts, with only a few
exceptions, 19 have not required warnings. Here
too, the military courts have co:r;npared the
Article 31 (b) warnings with the Miranda
warnings. If the military interrogator need not
give warnings under Art.icle a1, no Miranda
warnings are required. 20
The
cently
where
teered

practice of using informants. WBt!:L.reexamined i11 Un,ited States. v. Kirby 21
Air Force OSIC~g~nts ~s;c!f the. ;oiunservices of the accused's :roo:rnmate. to
reco~er so1lle .sta"I~n p~operty. · The CoiirC of
Miiitary Appeals could find .no requirement to
warn and noted that the informant:whoV'olunteered his services had notacted iu an offiCial
capacity although the OSI officewas aware that
he would attempt to obtain the contraband. The
court specifically declined to set out a "comprehensive statement of the precise characteristics
of officiality where the other party is not a person known to the. acc\lsed a:::;. ala:w enforcement
officer or a superior.'• 22
However, Rule 312(d) (1) (B). discussed in
the next section. requires that undercover
agents or infQtm::tnts :r;nust give right to counsel warnings if the suspect has peen charged or
is in some form of pretrial restraint.

B. Custodial Interrogations
Once the initial question of deciding "who"
must give the Miranda warnings is settled, the
issue {)f ''when'' the warnings· must be given
may
That issu~. may be further
reduced to two points: The definition of "custody" and the definition of "interrogation."

adaressed.
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First, as to the element of custody, the
Miranda warnings, according the the Supreme
Court, were required when questioning was
initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person was taken in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 23 The new provision in the Military
Rules of Evidence, Rule 305 (d) (1), states that
counsel warnings are required when:

(A) ... [T] he accused or suspect is in custody, could reasonably believe himself or herself to be in custody, or is othe1-wise deprived
of his or her freedom () f action in any significant way; or
(B) The interrogation is conducted by a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice acting in a law enforcement capacity,
or an agent of such a person, the interrogation is conducted subsequent to preferral or
charges or the imposition of pretrail restraint
under paragraph 20 of this Manual, and the
interrogation concerns the offenses or matters that were the subject of the preferral of
charges ot· were the cause of the imposition
of pretrial restraint. 24
Note that this provision expands the requirement of warnings to situations which may not
necessarily be "custodial" but occur after preferral of charges or pretrial restraint. Determining whether the suspect has been charged
or is in restraint should provide no problems.
Unfortunately for the practitioner, few hard
and fast rules apply in defining "custody." An
imprisoned suspect has normally been considered to be in custody25 but not all police-station
interrogations are custodial. 26 Conversely, not
all interrogations conducted in the surroundings
familiar to the suspect are necessarily noncustodial. 27
While the Supreme Court is apparently limiting those situations which might normally be
considered custodial 28 the military courts do not
reveal an eagerness to so reduce the impact of
Miranda. That is probably true in part to the
recognition by the courts of the subtle, inherent
coerciveness, that of necessity exists in the
military. 29 But again, not all military interro-

gations are custodial nor does the superiorsubordinate relationship between interrogator
and suspect necessarily in and of itself require
a finding of custody. ao
To meet the task of determining whether the
suspect was in custody, the various state, federal, and military courts have relied on several
different tests: the subjective intent of the
questioner, the subjective intent of the suspect,
and an objective test. 31 Application of either of
the first two obviously presents a possibility for
judicial swearing contests. The objective test,
applied by at least one federal circuit court32
and apparently adopted in a military decision,
United States v. Temperley, 33 has apparently
been incorporated in large part in the new
military evidence rules. 34 The new military test,
a hybrid of sorts, requires at least some consideration of the circumstances of the interrogation through the eyes of the suspect. The intent
of the interrogator is apparently not a factor
under the new rule.
The second portion of the inquiry of when
the warnings are required turns on the defmition of "interrogation." Miranda speaks simply
in terms of "questioning" although more recent
Supreme Court decisions have expanded the
requirement to those situations where the interrogators engaged in conversations designed
to elicit incriminating information. A striking
example of this is the now well-recognized conversation, the "Christian Burial Speech," initiated by the detective in Brewer v. Williams. 35
The military courts have likewise adopted a
broader application of "interrogation" to include eonversations or discussions. In United
States v. Borodzik, 36 for example, the Court of
Military Appeals indicated that:
When conversation is designed to elicit a response from a suspect, it is interrogation,
regardless of the subtlety of the approach. 97
A fascinating example of the "subtle" approach
occurred in United States v. Fox 88 where the
interrogator stopped to chat with the suspect.
He engaged him in a two-hour long "cat-and
mouse" game-a game successfully thwarted
by the mouse, according to the court. Ironically,
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after the so:..called chat had ended, the suspect
voh1lltarily implicated himself. 39 The court
sustained the conviction but cautioned against
such police practices.
. The broader definitional approa~h to interrogation has been incorporated in the new Military Rules of Evidence. Rule 305 (b) (2) provides:

"Interrogation" includes any formal or informal questioning in which an incriminating respmise either is saught or is a reasonable consequence of such questioning.
Left for further litigation is the question of
whether military interrogators must give
Miranda warnings prior to asking what are
typically characterized as threshold or pedigree questioning. The civilian courts have generally recognized no such requirement 40 but in
those military cases where, for example, the
suspect's identity was in issue, failure to give
the Miranda warnings was fatal. 41 However,
where identity is not in· issue or where the
individual is not a suspect, the courts will not
normally require the Miranda warnings. 42
Still exempt from Mirand~Teptpia warnings
are the spontaneo1,1s or voh,mt~er~d statemehts
from the suspect. 43 And interrogations which
are affectedonly bythe Article ~J (a) privilege
against self-incrimi~ati9IJ. qo not inclMd,~ a
right t<L£.Ounsel. 44

The Supreme Court language in Miranda
required that a suspect receive warnings advising him of the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Other language indicated that denial of counsel based on
indigency would not be "supportable by reason
or logic." 45 The Court noted:

-.,

In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent ·of his rights under this
system then, it is necessary to warn him not
only tha,t he has the right to consult with an
a,ttorney, but a~so that if he is indigent a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him. 46

The Court of Military Appeals in Tempia, emphasized the foregoing language noting that for
service members being interrogated, indigency
could not serve as a bar to the right to counsel
under MirandaY Tempia, in applying Miranda
to military interrogations, neither expanded
nor contracted the Miranda rights.
However, in the 1969 Manual for CourtsMartial the framers expanded the Miranda
rights for service members to include either a
civilian counsel or appointed military counsel.
No showing of indigency was required. 48 Subsequent military rights-warnings cards 49 and
waiver certificates 50 broadened the ManWLl
rights by informing the military suspects of
the additional dght to individual military
counsel if reasonably available.
The new Military Rules of Evidence change
this. First, as to the indigency language, the
Court of Military Appeals had in two decisions,
United States v. Clark 51 and United States v.
Hofbauer, 52 held that because Tempia was used
only to apply Miranda, the 1969 Manual language was too broad. A service member was entitled to appointed counsel only if, in Miranda's
image, he could not afford a civilian counsel.
But the indigency issue has apparently now
shifted back to favoring the 1969 Manual language. Rule 305 (d) (2), provides:
Counsel. When a person entitled to counsel
under this rule requests counsel, a judge advocate or law specialist within the meaning of
Article 1 Or an individual certified in accordance with Article 27 (b) shaU be provided by
the United States at no expense to the person
and without regard to the person's indigency
or lack thereof before the interrogation may
proceed [emphasis added].
The apparent intent of the drafters was to
overrule Clark and Hofbauer. A military
suspect is, under the new rules, entitled to appointed military counsel regardless ·of indigency.
The second major issue regarding limitations
of the military suspect's right to counsel is
whether the suspect should be entitled to an
individually requested military counsel. The
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new rules again make a change. A military
suspect, under the new rules, 'Will not be entitled to an individually requested military
counsel at an interrogation. Even with this new
limitation the military suspect's right to counself will remain broader than his civilian counterpart's right. In theory, at least, the civilian
suspect must make some indication of indigency
before receiving an appointed counsel. The
military suspect may receive a military counsel
by simply .so indicating to his interrogators.
D. Invoking the Right-Waiving the Right
The preceding sections centered on delineation of the Miranda-Tempia rights warnings.
Once the warnings are given to the military
suspect a series of new issues arise. We turn
first to the situation where the suspect requests
to see counsel. Several options are available to
the interrogators.
First, they may decide to either allow the
suspect to arrange for counsel or they may
themselves contact an attorney for the purpose
of advising the suspect. If they decide not to
allow the suspect to contact an attorney, then
they may either release him or hold him for a
reasonable time while continuing their investigation. 53 They may not, however, continue to
que.stion the suspect. 54
Should the suspect indicate a willingness to
forego the services of an attorney, then the
interrogators may continue their questioning.
The burden of establishing a voluntary waiver
of the right to counsel rests on the Government.
Although a written waiver is not a prerequisite
to admissibility of a military suspect's statements under the new rules, the existence of
such certainly assists the prosecutor in meeting
his burden. 55 The suspect's "silence" when
asked whether he wishes to see counsel does not
in itself establish a waiver. 5 6 If the suspect does
not decline affirmatively the right to counsel,
the prosecutor must establish the waiver by a
preponderance of the evidence. 57
Some special problems are present for the
Government if the suspect's statements were

made a.fter he initially indicated a desire'to see
a counsel. Although language in Miranda seems
to prohibit any so-called follow-up questioning
(or conversation designed to elicit a response)
later Supreme Court decisions apparently make
allowance for it. For example, in Michigan v.
Mosely 58 the court stated that if a statement is
later obtained the test to be applied is whether
the suspect's rights to cut off questioning have
been "scrupulously honored.'' 59 The Court of
Military Appeals has followed suit in several
recent cases. In United States v. Hill, 60 the
court allowed for subsequent questioning but
found no waiver under the facts presented. But
in United State[!. v. Quin:tarwP the Government
was able to sustain its burqep .9f ~howing
waiver, which in the court's estimation is very
heavy when the statement follows an invocation of the Miranda--Tempia rights. Under
law, there is no per
exclusion of those later
statements. 62

se

The "subsequent statement" scenario occurs
in a variety of situations. Most arise in the
hours or days following the invocation. Typically, the investigators fo1Iow up with an inquiry as to whether the suspect has in fact seen
or spoken with a lawyer or if he has changed
his mind. Most military courts recognize the
validity of such a procedure. 63 A related point
here,· and discussed more fully in later sections,
is that if the investigators know that the
suspect is represented by counsel, notice must
be given to that counsel of any further questioning.

E. Effect of Incomplete Warnings: The,
Miranda Exclusionary Rule

·

To give meaning to its mandate, the Supreme
Court in Miranda set out its exclusionary rule:
The prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory ot inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it . demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. 6 ~

.1
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The military adopted the foregoing rule in the
1969 Manual for Courts-Martial. 65 But as. in
other areas of M%'randa, 66 the Supreme Court.
has liberalized its application of Miranda. In
Harris v. N6.W York, 61 the court ruled that incomplete or erroneous Miranda warnings could
nonetheless be used to impeach the accused's
testimony. The Harris rule, however, was specifically rejected by the Court of Military Appeals in United States v~ J9rdon. 68 1;'}}e court
noted that the Supreme Court's decision in
Harris would determine the issue it it turned
solely on constitutionaJ construction. However,
the court continued, the 1969 Manual proscription had the force of law, under congressional
delegation of power to the President, and would
apply until changed. It has been changed.
The new Military Rules of Evidence ll()W
bring the military exclusionary rule more in
line with current civilian practice. The applicable rule, Rule 304 (b), allows statements
obtained after faulty Miranda warnings to be
used for impeachment. 69 Whether faulty
Miranda warnings in a military interrogation
will void any other derivative evidence is ~~g1
undecided. The Supreme Court has not allowed
Harris-type statements to serve a~a validb~sis
for probable C~l}Se to search. 70 Note that not
ali defective Miranda· wa~nings. are. neces~_~rily
fatal. Although an investigator's mistakes in
giving the Article 31 (b) warnings almost always call for the exclusion of any resulting
statements, 71 there are several military cases
which allow for "substantial compliance" in
giving the right to counsel warnings. For example/in United States v. Wilcox 72 the investigator told the suspect that he had a. right to
individual military counsel at his own expense.
The court noted that the advice was clearly
wrong but that substantial compliance coupled
with a lack of prejudice satisfied foundational
requirements for the admissibility· of the
suspect's statements. Now, of course, even
those warnings not substantially complying
with Miranda may be used for at least impeachment.

F. Summary
The new Military Rules of Evidence obviously
impact on application of the fifth amendment
protections, the Mirand~Tempia warnings, to
military interrogations. It is in this area that
counsel can expect to see more conformity with
civilian practice and should therefore find
civilian precedent helpful in litigating the matter\ Particular note should be paid to those rules
;hich. clarify and expand the definition of "custodial interrogation," 73 establish new limits on
the suspect's choice of counsel, 74 and adopt the
Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. New
York. 75 Having examined the circumstances of
the interrogation to determine if MirandaTempia is applicable, counsel should next turn
to consider whether any sixth amendment
issues are involved.

II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AT INTERROGATIONS
It is in the area of thernilitary's application
of the sixth amendment that we see the greatest expansion of the susp~ct's right· to counsel
at a military interrogation and at the same
time the greatest potential for uncertainty. The
seminal case is Escobedo v. Illinois 76-a precursor to Miranda. In Escobedo the accused's
request to see his defense counsel had been improperly thwarted by interrogators. But even
absent a request from the suspect to see his
counsel, sixth amendment rights may be violated. Two Supreme Court decisions, Massiah
v. United States 77 and Brewer v. Williams 78 are
prime examples. In Massiah the accused, after
arraignment, was questioned by a bugged informant with his counsel present. His sixth
amendment right to counsel, said the court, had
been violated. A similar result occurred in
Brewer where, after arraignment, the accused
was engaged in "conversation" by a detective ;79
the court found no waiver of the accused's sixth
amendment rights. so In neither case did the
accused request to see counsel, yet the sixth
amendment right to counsel was improperly
denied.
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The military courts, relying on EscobedQ and
its progeny have in the past generally followed
the Supreme Court's rule. But in United States
v. Turner, 81 the Court of Military Appeals,
broadened the sixth ame11dment protections to
include an accused who .had not requested to
see his attorney and who was not aware that
an attorney had unsuccessfully attempted to
see him prior to the interrogation.
After being released to military investigators
by state authorities, Private Shawn Turner was
placed tn an interrogation room. In a neighboring office, a civilian attorney indicated to the
investigators that he represented Turner on
some other matters and considered himself
counsel for Turner "generally"; his request to
see Turner was denied. The subsequent interrogation did not include advice to Turner of the
availability of an attorney. He waived his
rights and confessed. The Army Court of Military Review found no denial of the accused's
rights to counsel82 but the Court of Military
Appeals reversed, incorporating the dissenting
opinion of the lower court's decision. 83
The court noted that the civilian attorney's
announcement that he represented the accused
was sufficient . for the investigators to have
assumed that he in fact was the accused's ~t
torney. Citing several state decisions, and reiying principally on People v. Donovan,B4 the
court held that the investigators' blocka.de had
frustrated the accused's sixth ainendfuei1t
rights to counsel. In effect, a miiitary suspect's
counsel may now invoke the "right to see
counsel."
At face value, Turner mandates a rule not
yet required by any Supreme Court opiniori. 85
The decision's full impact is yet to be seen. As
a practical matter, when investigators are confronted by art "attorney" for the suspect, a few
questions of the visitor may reveal whether in
fact a relationship approximating an attorneyclient relationship in fact exists with the
suspect. 86
Note that Rule 305 (d) (1) (A), discussed
earlier, 87 requires that counsel warnings be
given at any interrogations conducted after the

suspect is under restrai11t or charges have been
preferred. This may solve in part any future
Tu-rner-type problems related to determining
when the right to counsel attaches. It is safe to
conclude that upon the occurrence of either of
the foregoing events, both of the applicable
fifth and sixth amendment rights will be triggered for military interrogations. ss
Our discussion to this stage has centered .on
twoconstitutionally-based protections. We turn
now to the third and fimil f~cet, a notice requirement that rests not on .the Constitution, but
rather on the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

III. NOTICE TO COl;r:tfSEL OF
INTERROGATION
The third and final "rig.ht" to counsel, a
notice requirement, rests in part on a perceived
need to· prevent law enforcement officials from
depriving a suspect of applicable fifth and sixth
amendment rights. Simply pqt, if the suspect
has an attorney, the interrogators niust give
notice to that attorney of any. proposed interrogations. This third "right," however, finds no
consistent or clear application in the chiilian
courts. Unless sixth amendment rights are involved, that is, the right to counsel has attached,
civilian courts will generally allow questioning
of the suspect without prior notice to his counseJ.89 Clearly, a different ru1e applies to military
interrogations.
The military's notice requirement is grounded
in the Court of Military Appeals decision; in
United States v. Mc0mber. 9 9 Chief Judge
Fletcher, writing for the court, noted that the
leanings of the court had been toward a notice
rule and stated:
If the right to counsel is to retain any vital-

ity, the focus in testing for prejudice must be
readjusted where an investigator questions
an accused known to be represented by counsel. We therefore hold that once an investigator is on notice that an attorney has under~
taken to represent an individual in a military
crb:nj11al investigation, further questioning
of the accused without affording counsel rea-
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sonable opportunity to be present renders
any statement obtained involuntary under
Article 31 (d) of the Uniform Code. 91
The rational for the rule was derived from
Article 27 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice-not the sixth amendment.
McOmber in laying a broader, more protective statutory right to counsel, did not answer
the question of whether notice was required if
a different offense was later discovered and the
investigators wished to renew questioning of
the suspect. Nor did it answer a key issue of
whether the questioning agent needed "actual"
notice that an acused was represented by counsel. Each question has since been addressed by
the court.

A. interrogation for Different Offense
Apparently, if the offenses under investigation are in any way related, McOmber will,
apply. For example, in United States v.
Lowry/ 2 both interrogations dealt with the
accused.'s possible role in the arson of several
buildings. Although each interrogation dealt
with different buildings, the court was unwilling to make "subtle distil~ctions" that require
the separation of offense occurring within the
same general area within a short period of
time. 93 Recently, in United States v. Littlejohn/4 the court held that no notice was requited where the offenses in question were
committed within two days of each other but
involved distinct and unrelated matters. 95

Th:r~mportant point here is the "subtle distinction" proscription in Lowry, supra. If the
offenses are not clearly distinct and unrelated,
the prudent investigator should give the M cOmber notice to the suspect's counsel. That
assumes of course that the investigator has
notice that a defense counsel is representing
the suspect. Despite its holding in Littlejohn,
the court will continue to.. clQ~ely examine the
investigator's actions and motives. If bad faith
in apparent, there should be no doubt that the
court will refuse to make "subtle" distinctions.

B. "Notice" of Representation by Counsel
Recall that the McOmb~r notice i13 required
where an investigator is on notice that an attorney has undertaken to represent an individual in a military criminal investigation. A
number of decisions from both the CotJrt. of
Military Appeals and the various serviee appellate courts have concluded that in· the ab.:sence of bad faith, investigators will only be
required to give the McOmber notice if they
have actual knowledege that the suspect is represented. In United States v. Harris/ 6 the
Court of Military Appeals declined to extend
McOmber's mandate to inclu9.e arequirement
that the investigators inquire of the suspect
whether an attorney-client relationship exists.
And in United States v. Littlejohn, supra, the
court rejected the defense argument that McOmber notice should have been given to the
defense counsel who would have inevitably
represented the accused. The McOmber rule,
according to the court is not concerned with
probable representation but rather with "an
existing attorney-client relationship." 97 Again,
this area is suspect ; in both cases the court was
persuaded by the reasonableness of the investigator's actions. Evidence of bad faith could
easily change the results reached in those
cases. 98
Rule. 305 (e) of the new Military Rules of
Evidence includes a McOmber notice requirement:
Notice to Counsel. When a person subject to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice who is
required to give warnings under subdivision
(c) intends to question an accused or person
suspected of an offense and knows or reasonably should know that counsel either has been
appointed for or retained by the accused or
suspect with respect to that offense, the cou~
sel must be notified of the intended interrogation and given a reasonable time in which to
attend before the interrogation may proceed.
Note that this new rule expands the McOmber
rule beyond the limits set by Littlejohn and
Harris, supra. 99 Whether the investigator
knows or should know of an existing attorney-
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client relationship will obviously depend on the
factors surrounding each interrogation. 100

cessfully attempt to see the a()cused? If so,
there may be a sixth amendment issue.

One defense method of short-circuiting
claims of investigator ignorance might be for
defense counsel to formally advise law enforcement personnel of his or her role as the . accused's attorney. 101 The potential impact of this
new rule probably requires that the farsighted
investigator simply ask the suspect if an attornet has been appointed or retained. The investigator surely .runs the risk of the suspect
answering in the affirmative and invoking his
right to counsel but ·the benefits of clearing the
air and avoiding a possible ·McOmber notice
problem must not be overlooked.

Sixth, was the interrogator required to give
McOmber notice to counsel? If notice was
given, was the counsel given a reasonable
opportunity to be present?
Counsel's analysis should begin, but in no way
end with these six issues. They should be used
as primary tools for focusing on the key areas.
Each inquiry should then be further subjected
to detailed analysis using applicable case law
and the new rules as a template for specifically
framing the issues to be litigated. In summary,
particular attention should be paid to the major innovations in the Military Rules of Evidence which:
1. Expand the right to counsel warnings to
interrogations not necessarily custodial
but occurring after charges are preferred
or pretrial restraint imposed ; 102

IV. CONCLUSION
In litigating the various issues associated
with this aspect of military interrogations,
counsel should resist the urge to rush into an
analysis which treats only the broader, more
confusing, issue of "right to counsel." Each
particular "right" should first be examined
separately. In any case in which an interrogation of the accused is in issue, counsel should
apply a six-step analysis:

First, were right to counsel warnings required either by case law or the new rules of
evidence?
Second, if the accused gave a statement without requesting counsel, is there evidence of a
valid waiver of the right to counsel?
Third, if the accused gave a, statement after
initially re·questing counsel, ~8 there evidence
to sustain the government's heavy burden of
showing a valid waiver?
Fourth, if there was no complianc·e with the
requirements to give the applicable right to
counsel warnings, is the statement otherwise
voluntary and therefore admissible for impeachment purposes under the new rules?
Fifth, did the accused's counsel at any time
prior to, or during the interrogation, unsuc-

2. Adopt the Supreme Court decision in
Harris v. New York; 103
3. Limit the suspect's right to individually
requested military counsel ; 104
4. Expand the McOmber notice requirement
to cases where the investigator reasonably should know that counsel has been
retained or appointed.105
These recent changes reflect a somewhat
spirited growth of the rights to counsel at military interrogations and so mark a major step
in the development of military criminal law.
The potential for litigating right to c~p,nsel
issues is ripe and the new Military Rules of
evidence and recent case law insure ample
opportunity for litigation.

FOOTNOTES
1

The new Rules, approved by President Carter on 12
March 1980, will replace existing Chapter 27 of the
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1969
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DA Pam 27-50-88
11

u.s.

18

See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966);
cf. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).

19

See, e.g., United States v. Johnstone, 5 M.J. 744
(A.F.C.M.R. 1978}, pet: granted, 6 M.J. 145 (1978) on
other issues. The Court was satisfied that the questioning by the informant was "official." The MirandaTempia warnings were not addressed; obviously under the facts the questioning was not custodial.

20

§ 3501 (1970), The "Post-Miranda Act"
or the "Anti-Miranda Act" which was enacted as part
of the Omnibus Crime. C~ntr~i and S~fe Streets Act
of 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197.

The situation may of course arise where an interrogator not subject to the Code and not acting as an
agent of the military is not required to give Article
31 (b) warnings, but will be required to give a military suspect, in custody, the Miranda warnings.

21

8 M.J. 8 (C.M.A. 1979).

5

16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).

23

8

384 U.S. at 444.

7

The Article 31(b) warnings, the military's statutory
warnings, do not provide a right to counsel warning.
They are separately required although the 31 (b)
warnings and the Miranda right to counsel warnings
are almost always given contemporaneously. Most
military cases thus merge discussion of both.

• 384

436 (1966).

• For a discussion of the Miranda decision and its impact, see Lederer, Miranda v. Arizona-The Law Today, 78 Mil. L. Rev. 197 (1977). See also Chyette, The
Right to Counsel in Police Interrogation Cases:
Miranda and Williams, 12 U. of Mich. L. Rev. 112
(1978); Dorris, The Declining Miranda Doctrine:
The Supreme Court's Development of Miranda Issues,
36 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 259 (1979); Sunderland,
Self-Incrimination and Constitutional Principle: Miranda v. Arizona and Beyond, 15 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 171 (1979).

•see 18 U.S.C.

• MCM, 1969, para. l40a(2).

'"8 M.J. at 11 (C.M.A. 1979).

Rule 305(b) (1), M.R.E.

11

E.g., a company commander. See United States v.
Jordon, 20 C.M.A. 614, 44 C.M.R. 44 (1971).

H
16

28

Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Barfield
v. Alabama, 522 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1977) (murder
suspect was "free" to leave); United States v. ·Gustafson, 17 C.M.A. 150, 37 C.M.R. 414 (1967) (suspect
free to leave at any time, not under arrest).

27

Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (suspect not
free to leave his own room at 4 A.M.).·

""See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, supra note 26.
29

In United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R.
249 (1969) the court noted that:
In the military, unlike civil life, a suspect may be
required to report and submit to questioning quite
without regard to warrants or other legal process.
It ignores the realities of that situation to say that
orie ordered to appear for interrogation has not
been significantly deprived of his freedom of action.
37 C.M.R. at 256.

30

United States v. Jordon, 20 C.M.A. 614, 44 C.M.R.
( 1971). The issue of rank difference or position of
authority may of course require Article 3l(b) warnings. See United States v. Doble, 1 M.J. 223 (C.M.A.
1975) where the court noted that "[i]ndeed, in the
military setting in which we operate, wh'ich depends
for its very existence upon superior-subordinate relationships, we must recognize that the position of the
questioner, regardless of his motives, may be the moving factor in an accused's or suspect's decision to
speak.

6 M.J. 226 (C.M.A. 1978).
6 M.i; at 227. The offenses occurred in the civilian
comf8t1nity at the Federal Republic of Germany. and
the victim was a Turkish national residing in Germany.

18

6 M.J. at 229. See also United States v. Mundt, 508
F.2d 904; 906 (lOth Cir. 1974); cert. denied, 421 U.S.
949 (1975); United States v. Kilday, 481 U.S. 655
(5th Cir. 1973).

17

Mere presence of an American agent is insufficient to
invoke Miranda. United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211
(2d Cir. 1972). And furnishing information which results in interrogation is insufficient to warrant Miranda warnings. United States v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d
904 (9th Cir. 1971).

436, 444 (1966).

"'See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
Rule 305(d) (1) (A) does not really change this. The
major change lies in requiring the Miranda-Tempia
warnings after preferral of charges.

"MQM, 169, para. 140a(2).
"' The Court of Military Appeals has required the
Article 31(b) warnings, and by implication the
Miranda-Tempia warnings of those questioners in a
position of authority over the suspect. See, e.g., United States v. Dahle, 1 M.J. 223 (C.M.A. 1975).

u.s.

"'Rule 305(d)(1) M.R.E. This rule is apparently intended in part to codify Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977) and Massiah v. United St:;ttes, 377 U.S.
201 (1964).

• Rule 305(d), M.R.E.
10

384

DA Pam 27-50-88

12
31

See Lederer, Miranda, supra note 3 at 130.

32

United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert.denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1971).

""22 C.M.A. 384, 47 C.M.R. 235 (1973).

•• Rule 305(f), M.R.E. restates present law. But it
leaves open the question of when, if at all, questioning may later be resumed.
""Rule 305(g)(1), M.R.E. provides:
(g) Waiver. (1) General rule. After receiving applicable warnings under this rule, a person may
waive the rights described therein and in rule 301
and make a statement. The waiver must be made
freely, knowingly, and intelligently.

"'Rule 305(d)(1)(A) M.R.E., note 24, supra and accompanying text.
.. 430

u.s.

387 (1977).

36

21 C. M.A. 95, 44 C.M.R. 149 (1971).

37

44 C.M.R. at 151. Investigators had indirectly questioned the suspect via his wife.

38

8 M.J. 526 (A.C.M.R. 1979), pet. granted, 8 M.J. 220
(C.M.A. 1980).

89

After they had ended their discussion the accused
walked the agent to his car and after some further
talk, implicated himself. The agent responded by telling the accused, "Remember, I have not asked you any
questions pertaining to the case. I cannot do that."
8 M.J. at 528.

40

Note that the Supreme Court in Miranda stated that
"[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts, surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact finding process is not affected by our
holding," 384 U.S. at 477.

"See, e.g., United States v. Phifer, 18 C.M.A. 508, 40
C.M.R. 220 (1969); United States v. Allison, 40
C.M.R. 602 (A.B.R. 1969). But see United States v.
Butler, 39 C.M.R. 563 (A.B.R. 1968).
.. United States v. Ballard, 39 C.M.R. 563 (A.B.R.
1968).
'"See, e.g., United States v. Frederick, 7. M.J. 791
(N.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. Willeford, 5 M.J.
634 (A.F.C.M.R. 1978).

A written waiver is not required. The accused or
suspect must acknowledge affirmatively that he or
she understands the rights involved, affirmatively
decline the right to counsel and affirmatively consent to making a statement.
See North Carolina v. Butler, __ U.S. __ (1979).
And a statement will not be involuntary if given by
a suspect who was aware of his rights and intentionally frustrated diligent attempts to give the necessary warnings. United States v. Sikorski, 21 C.M.A.
345, 45 C.M.R. 119 (1972).
36

United States v. Long, 37 C.M.R. 696 (A.B.R. 1967).

57

Rule 305(g) (2), M.R.E.

.. 423

u.s. 96

(1975).
/

•• 423 U.S. at 104.
•o

5 M.J. 114 (C.M.A. 1978).

61

5 M.J. 484 (C.M.A. 1978).

•• The Court of Military Appeals in Hill, supra note 60
at 115 noted that the per se rule had apparently been
rejected in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
68

See, e.g., United States v. Hill, supra note 60 'and
United States v. Quintana, supra note 61.

.. 384 U.S. at 444.

"Rule 305 (d)_(1), M.R.E.
""MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2).
•• 384 U.S. at 472.
•• !d.
47

37 C.M.R. at 258.

46

MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2).

•• Department of the Army Rights Warnings Card,
GTA 19-6-2.
""DA Form 3881, Rights Warnings/Waiver Certificate.
51

22 C.M.A. 570, 48 C.M.R. 77 (1974).

•• 5 M.J. 409 (C.M.A. 1978).
""See United States v. Hill, 5 M.J. 114, 116-118 (C.M.A.
1978) (Fletcher, C. J., dissenting) for discussion of
options available to the investigators.

';

'~

:',,J

~.

:.

' ··'

·:.~ ~J)

.. For example, it is generally considered that the Court
has whittled away at the "custody" requiretrlent.
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Beckvvith
v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). See geilJ¥-iilly
Dorris, The Declining Miranda Doctrine: The
Supreme Court's Development of Miranda Issues, 36
Wash: and Lee L. Rev. 259 (1979).
67

401

u.s. 222

(1971).

.. 20 C.M.A. 614, 44 C.M.R. 44 (1971). See also United
States v. Girard, 23 C.M.A. 263, 49 C.M.R. 438
(1975).
69

The new rule follows Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971).

70

Massachusetts v. White, 47 L.W. 4066 (12 Dec. 1978).

DA Pam 27-50-88
13
"'-See, e.g., United States v. Willeford, 5 M.J.
(A.F.C.M.R. 1978) (failure to adequately advise of
offense in question rendered statements . faulty and
therefore inadmissible). Rule 304 (b) sup-;.a note 69
and accompanying text does not change this law. A
statement obtained in violation of Article 31(b) is
inadmissible for all purposes.

"' See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
"Under the new rules, Turner arguably could have
received right to counsel warnings because he was
under pretrial restraint. The new rules do not further
define "pretrial restraint."
89

See, e.g., United States v. Newell, 578 F.2d 827 (9th
Cir. 1978) (good discussion comparing civilian and
military notice rules); United States v. Cobbs, 481
F.2d 196 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert denied, 414 U.S. 980
(1973); United States v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35 (8th Cir.
1974).

00

1 M.J. 380 (C.M.A. 1976). For some initial impressions of the decision see, Lederer, United States v .
McOmber, A Brief Critque, The Army Lawyner, Jun.
1976, at 5.

'" 3 M.J. 863 (A.C.M.R. 1977).
'"Rule 305(d)(1), M.R.E.
,. Rule 305(d) (2), M.R.E.
'"Rule 304(b), M.R.E.

u.s. 478
377 u.s. 201
430 u.s. 387

... 387

(1964).

17

(1964).

78

79

(1977).

The Court found the conversation to be in fact an
interrogation. See also note. 35 supra and accompanying text.

"'The decision has prompted a number of indepth
articles on the subject of applicable fifth and sixth
amendment rights of interrogators. See, e.g., Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda:
What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter?, 67
Geo. L. J. 1 (1978); Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v.
Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record,
66 Geo. L. J. 209 (1977).
01

5 M.J. 148 (C. M.A. 1978).

.. 3 M.J. 566 (A.C.M.R. 1977).
'"'3 M.J. 572-75 (A.C.M.R. 1977) (Costello J. dissenting).
,.13 N.Y. 2d 148, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 841, 193 N.E. 2d 628
(1963) (improper denial of sixth amendment right to
counsel to allow interrogation to continue after accused, a lawyer retained by him, or his family request
an opportunity to confer).
85

88

The Supreme Court generally adheres to the commencement of formal adversary proceedings as the
triggering element of the availability of the sixth
amendment right to counsel. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (interrogation after
arraignment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964) (interrogation after arraignment). See
generally Cooper, The Sixth Amendment and Military
Criminal Law: Constitutional Protection~ and Beyond, 84 Mil. L. Rev. 41 (1i)79).

Turner does not allow an "interloper" to invoke the
suspect's sixth amendment rights, nor would it allow
a counsel who will perhaps inevitably represent the
suspect, to invoke the right. Turner should be limited
to those situations where an attorney-client relationship exists.

"'1 M.J. at 383.
"' 2 M.J. 55 ( C.M.A. 1976).
.. 2 M.J. at 59.
•• 7 M.J. 200 (C.M.A. 1979).

•• See also United States v. Harris, 7 M.J. 154 (G.M.A.
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'""Rule 305 (d) (1) (A}, M.R.E.

'"'Rule 304(b), M.R.E.
10

'

'

00

Rule 305(d) (2), M.R.E.

Rule 305(e), M.R.E.

The Impact of Article 82 of Protocol I to The 1949 Geneva Conventions on the
Organization and Operation of a Division SJA Office
Captain Michael C. Denny, JAGC, Olfice of The Sta.(fJudge Advocate
Fort Stew(J;rt, Geo'rgia
Currently, the State Department is reviewing
and drafting comments to the Protocols to .the
.1949 Geneva Conventions. The purpose of this
Article is to determine what impact Article 82
of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 1
may have on the operati~n of a Division SJA
Office if they are adopted. The effect of Ar~icle
82 clearly depends on the interpretation of the
Article. A narrow reading would require ·no
change in peace or war. A reading with a view
·toward its spirit and underlying rationale may
well require action by both the SJA and the
Division Commander. The starting point of the
analysis must begin with the origin of the Protocol.
''i'

Origin of the Protocol
In 1971 Hie International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) invited a group of governmental experts on various aspects of the .Law
of War to Geneva to consider modifications to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949:• Experts, representing ovef 70 countries, met from 1971 to ·
1973 and submitted proposed texts of two new
protocols to tM ICRC. Beginning in 1974, four
diplomatic conferences were held. On 10 June
1977, in the final act of the conferences, two
proposed protocols were signed.
.
Protocol I modernizes of the law of international armed conflicts with specific sections
dealing with such topics as medical aircraft,
works and instaJlations containing dangerous
. forces, and repression of breaches of the protocol. Protocol ·• If expands on the third article

common to· all the 1949 Geneva conventions.
This concerned conflicts not of an international
nature. The specific concern of this paper is
Article 82 of Protocol I-Legal Advsors in
Armed Forces. This article requires legal advisors to be available to give advice to military
commanders on the application of the Conventions and the Protocols and to give advice on
instruction to be given to members . of the
Armed Forces.
The committee of experts and the diplomatic
conference both recognized that the law of war
would be more effectively observed if a legal
advisor were available to commanders. This is
an implicit recognition that the law of war as
stated in both the Geneva and Hague conventions is becoming more detailed and specific
over a broad range of topics. Requiring a legal
advisor would be a natural consequence of the
increased complexity of the law.
It is also a recognition that the commanders
are responsible for their actions as professional
soldiers. They are presumed to know the law
and will be held accountable for their actions
whether they have had any specific training in
the law of war or not.

Analysis of the Language of Article 82
In order to evaluate the impact of Article 82
one must look closely to the language of the
article and note what it states and perhaps just
as significantly, what it does not state.
In 1973 the draft text from the, gover~me~tal
experts (then Art. 71) stated

